Final Report Independent Review of the 2017 Protest Events in Charlottesville Virginia
White nationalists clash with constabulary as they are forced out of Emancipation Park after the "Unite the Right" rally Aug. 12 in Charlottesville, Va. Scrap Somodevilla/Getty Images hide caption
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White nationalists clash with police every bit they are forced out of Emancipation Park later the "Unite the Right" rally Aug. 12 in Charlottesville, Va.
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Updated at vi:30 p.m. ET
An contained review of Charlottesville's treatment of the white nationalist rally there in August plant that constabulary enforcement and city officials made several significant mistakes, resulting in violence and distrust.
The city deputed the report, which was prepared by Timothy Heaphy, a former U.S. attorney in Virginia. In conducting the investigation, Heaphy said his squad pored through hundreds of thousands of documents, interviewed hundreds of witnesses, and reviewed countless hours of video and audio.
The resulting 220-page written report is a detailed record of the chaos and disharmonize that unspooled in the Virginia college town. It is unsparing in identifying the errors regime fabricated that 24-hour interval and in the preceding months.
The city failed to protect either gratuitous expression or public safety, the report finds: "This represents a failure of one of government's core functions — the protection of cardinal rights. Law enforcement likewise failed to maintain order and protect citizens from impairment, injury, and decease. Charlottesville preserved neither of those principles on August 12, which has led to deep distrust of government within this community."
The "most tragic manifestation" of the failure to protect public rubber was the death of 32-twelvemonth-erstwhile Heather Heyer, the study says.
"Early on Baronial 12, CPD had placed a schoolhouse resources officer alone at the intersection of 4th Street NE and Market Street," the report explains. "This officer feared for her safety every bit groups of angry Alt-Right protesters and counter-protesters streamed by her as they left Emancipation Park. The officer called for aid and was relieved of her postal service. Unfortunately, CPD commanders did not replace her or make other arrangements to forbid traffic from traveling beyond the Downtown Mall on 4th Street."
All that remained to impede traffic was a single wooden sawhorse.
"This vulnerability was exposed when James Fields drove his vehicle down the unprotected street into a large crowd of counter-protesters at the intersection of quaternary Street SE and Water Street, killing Ms. Heyer," it says.
The report praised the city'due south burn section and the University of Virginia Health System for their quick response to victims of the auto set on, calling information technology "a bright success on a day largely filled with failure."
Some of the problems identified in the report echo the criticism of law enforcement response at the time; some are new revelations. Among the mistakes:
- Attempts in the days before the protest to move the upshot to a different location meant that law enforcement had to program for two scenarios.
- Charlottesville Law and Virginia State Police did non sufficiently coordinate their plans. On August 12, their officers could not communicate over the radio with one another because they were on unlike channels.
- Law did not fairly separate conflicting groups, which led to physical altercations.
- Police commanders instructed their officers not to intervene in all but the most serious concrete confrontations. They prepared to respond to violence by declaring an unlawful associates and dispersing the crowd.
- Once unlawful associates was declared, law efforts to disperse the crowd generated more violence, as conflicting groups were pushed toward each other.
- Officers remained backside barricades in relatively empty areas, rather than being stationed along crucial routes as protesters and counterprotesters shifted and clashed.
- Tactical gear wasn't accessible when officers needed it.
- Charlottesville Police received inaccurate information from Commonwealth's Attorney Dave Chapman regarding the legality of restricting weapons other than firearms. Chapman told constabulary they could non restrict other weapons, when in fact the urban center could take prohibited bats, poles and shields.
In a argument to NPR, Charlottesville Metropolis Manager Maurice Jones said that the city does "not concur with every attribute of the report's findings," but it is thankful for the work of the reviewers.
"Nosotros faced an unprecedented series of protests and demonstrations this summer, culminating with the Unite the Right Rally on August 12th," Jones said. "On a number of fronts, as the study acknowledges, nosotros succeeded in protecting our City to the all-time of our abilities. Only in other areas nosotros, and our law enforcement partner in the Virginia State Police, undoubtedly fell short of expectations, and for that nosotros are profoundly sorry. This report is one disquisitional step in helping this community heal and move forward subsequently suffering through this summer of hate."
Police Master Al Thomas Jr. released a statement maxim, "My hope now is that, as we motion forward ... nosotros can learn from the productive elements of this report, piece of work together to address our shortcomings and recommit ourselves to serving the public in a manner that gives our citizens the utmost confidence in their safety and wellbeing."
After documenting what went wrong, the report as well had a number of recommendations for Charlottesville and other municipalities that need to prepare for similar "mass unrest events."
Amongst Heaphy'due south recommendations:
- That cities use "the stadium arroyo": secure perimeters with designated points of entry and enforced separation of alien groups.
- That the Virginia General Assembly "criminalize the use of a flame to intimidate" and "empower municipalities to enact reasonable restrictions on the right to bear firearms at big protestation events."
- That police force recognize that "not all attendees at protest events volition coordinate with constabulary enforcement, either because they are too loosely organized to practise and then or because it is incompatible with their ideology." Rather than ignore such groups, agencies must plan for resistence and anticipate gaps in intelligence and planning.
- That the Justice Department or a national police force organization establish a clearinghouse to share information and plans before and after events.
- That police officers be trained in "the function of law enforcement in facilitating complimentary expression" and de-escalation techniques.
- That police use a continuum of strategies during such events: adopting a "soft" arroyo of "wearing ordinary uniforms and fugitive militarized approaches" that can stir unrest, while preparing for disorder with clear policies on making arrests and using force.
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Source: https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/12/01/567824446/charlottesville-made-major-mistakes-in-handling-protest-review-finds